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We document a novel type of international financial contagion whose driving 
force is shared financial intermediation. In the London peripheral sovereign debt 
market during pre-1914 period financial intermediation played a major 
informational role to investors, most likely because of the absence of international 
monitoring agencies and the substantial agency costs. Using two events of 
financial distress – the Brazilian Funding Loan of 1898 and the Greek Funding 
Loan of 1893 – as quasi-natural experiments, we document that, following the 
crises, the bond prices of countries with no meaningful economic links to the 
distressed countries, but shared the same financial intermediary, suffered a 
reduction relative to the rest of the market. This result is true for the mean, median 
and the whole distribution of bond prices, and robust to an extensive sensitivity 
analysis. We interpret this as evidence that the identity of the financial 
intermediary was informative, i.e, investors extracted information about the 
soundness of a debtor based on the performance of her financial intermediary. 
This spillover, informational in essence, arises as the flip-side of the relational 
lending coin: contagion arises for the same reason why relational finance (in this 
case, underwriting) helps alleviate informational and incentive problems,  
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I. Introduction 
Recent literature on international financial contagion has recognized the existence 
of informational channels of shock propagation in which crisis in one country affects the 
asset values issued by other countries, even in the absence of fundamental economic links, 
common external shocks, or mechanistic portfolio realignment issues. These channels has 
been called informational spillovers, or the “wake up call” hypothesis (Van Rijckeghem 
and Weder [2000], pp 3). Aside from explanations based on self-fulfilling crises, the 
literature was has not provided, neither theoretically nor empirically, any specific 
economic rationale capable of producing informational spillovers. In this paper, we 
document two examples in which the transmission mechanism of informational contagion 
is a shared financial intermediary.  
The London market for peripheral sovereign debt bonds in the pre-1914 period is 
the empirical setting. By studying two events of financial distress, the Brazilian funding 
loan of 1898 and the Greek funding loan of 1893, we show that countries with no 
meaningful economic links with distressed debtor but with a strong relationship with the 
same financial intermediary suffered a reduction in their bond prices in the secondary 
market above and beyond the rest of the market. These results suggest that the identity of 
the financial intermediary contained relevant information about borrowers. By observing 
the performance of other countries whose debt was vouched by same underwriter, 
investors learned about something about the soundness of a borrower, thus generating a 
form of informational contagion. A crisis in a relational debtor “waked up” investors to 
update their priors on the other asset values underwrote by the intermediary. 
The pre-1914 bond market shares some common characteristics with present day  
markets. The prevalence of indirect lending through bond issues as the main source of 
external funding for debtors, and the absence of an international legal system to enforce 
sovereign debt contracts are two such characteristics. Nevertheless, the many differences 
make the pre-1914 a particularly interesting setting for studying informational spillover in 
financial markets, especially when contagion is driven by shared financial intermediation 
(see Mauro, Yafeh [2003] to a lengthy comparison between the actual and the pre-WWI 
markets).  
  One crucial difference is the very existence of such long-term relationships 
between borrowers and financial intermediaries, and their modus operandi. Between 1870 
and 1914, several countries did all their debts issues with the same bank or with a 
syndicate of financial intermediaries led by the same bank. More importantly, these - 3 - 
leading banks played an active role in monitoring and advising their relational debtors, 
providing macroeconomic advice, debt management counseling, market-making of bonds, 
and direct lending services such as short-term credit advances (Flandreau, [2003]).  
The existence of these long-term relationships may reflect the fact that, compared 
to present day markets, there was considerably more informational asymmetry between 
bondholders and countries in the pre-1914 period, especially outside Western Europe. For 
example, the information readily available to the average British investor about the 
political and economic situation in Peru or Transvaal was not likely to be precise by 
today’s standards. Information gathering and monitoring were much costlier. While 
nowadays an investor in Amsterdam can easily verify how the Chilean current account 
balance behaved over the last five years, many of the countries and provinces that issued 
in the pre-1914 London bond market had not established an organized, systematic, and 
trustworthy standard for publishing their fiscal and commercial balances.  
Investigation on the institutions and the workings of London pre-1914 debt market 
indicate that the City’s sovereign market had two important features. First, by establishing 
long-term relationships, financial intermediaries reduced their marginal cost of gathering 
specific-country information, and improved their ability to monitor clients, thus acquiring 
a competitive advantage in underwriting the countries’ initial public offers of bonds. 
Second, the relationship was observable, therefore conveying information to bondholders. 
Given these two features make the pre-1914 a good empirical setting for testing the 
hypothesis of informational contagion by shared underwriter, a spillover driven by the 
fact that, when pricing assets issued by a country, investors took into account the 
credibility of the financial intermediary that had an observed long established relationship 
with that debtor. 
The Brazilian and Greek crises were chosen because they were the only events of 
financial distress that satisfied the following set of conditions. First, both countries had a 
strong financial relationship with a merchant  bank, the most important type financial 
intermediary operating in the London peripheral market. In both episodes the distress was 
caused mainly by internal reasons and/or commodity shocks, and not by a generalized 
financial crisis originated in the developed centers. Moreover, in both episodes there 
existed a group of countries (other than the country in distress) that had, at the time of the 
distress, a strong relationship with the same intermediary as the country in distress. 
Finally, countries that had a strong relationship with the same merchant bank cannot have 
meaningful economic linkages to the distressed country, and could not have been directly - 4 - 
affected by the commodity shock that might have caused, or intensified, the financial 
distress in the original country. With all these conditions satisfied, the event of financial 
distress in one country is a quasi-natural experiment for testing the hypothesis of 
informational contagion: countries that had a strong relationship with the same merchant 
bank are “treatment” units, and other countries are the “control” group. The hypothesis of 
informational contagion by shared underwriter is tested by comparing, around the period 
of financial distress, the dynamics of bond prices between these two groups of countries.. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the related literature. 
Section III contains a detailed description of the London market for peripheral sovereign 
debt, focusing on the level of risk that its participants faced.  Section IV describes the 
workings of financial relationships, with emphasis on the advantages of the relational 
underwriters in solving adverse selection and moral hazard problems faced by lenders. 
Section V explains the empirical strategy. We show that two episodes of financial 
distress, the Brazil in 1898 and Greece in 1893, are quasi-natural  experiments, and 
therefore provide an unique empirical opportunity to test for presence of informational 
contagion,. Section VI presents the data and the summary statistics. Section VII shows our 
main results. Section VIII discuss the findings, including alternative explanations, and 
concludes.  
 
II. Relating two literatures: contagion and relational lending 
 
During the 1990s, a consensus emerged that trade linkages are unable to totally 
account for the numerous events of contagion (Kumar and Persaud [2002]). Several works 
tried to fill the gap by studying the role of mechanical portfolio realignment and financial 
linkages in fomenting recent contagion episodes. Mechanical portfolio realignment 
spillovers arise between countries with no fundamental links when investors respond to a 
crisis by changing their investment strategies, following some optimum decision rule, as 
mean-variance framework, Value-at-Risk (Schinasi and Smith [2000]), or adjusting the 
portfolio’s exposure to risk factors (Kodres and Pritsker [2002]). Realignment can also be 
triggered by liquidity constraints or capital adequacy requirements (Valdés [1996]). 
Another set of papers, more closely related to but still quite distinct from ours, pursue the 
explanation of contagion among countries with shared common creditors. Common 
creditor spillovers happen when depositors call the creditor with exposure in the country 
under distress. To fulfill her commitments, the creditor sells her positions in another - 5 - 
country’s assets and contagion arises (Calvo [1998], Kaminsky and Reinhart [2000], Van 
Rijckeghem and Weder [2000]).   
Finally, spillover effects caused by herding behavior do provide an economic 
rationale for non-fundamental spillovers effects. However, informational contagion 
through shared underwriter produces sharper empirical implications because one can 
identify which countries should suffer contagion. For instance, Calvo and Mendoza 
[2000] explore the idea that the utility gains from processing country-specific information 
are small when there is a large set of investment options, leading investors to mimic 
arbitrary market portfolios. Thus, ex- post contagion, i.e., which countries are affected by 
some financial turmoil, depend upon the ex-ante arbitrary portfolios and market positions. 
Goldstein and Pauzner [2004] present a model in which the complementary nature of the 
investment (the number of individuals holding the assets affects their return), along with 
wealth effects on risk aversion, generate herding behavior. Again, the contagion results 
depend on portfolio decisions made ex- ante by investors.  
Differently from these studies, the spillover considered here is driven by 
investors,following a specific economic reasoning, such as reinterpreting information, 
updating beliefs and recalculating the expected returns of a whole class of assets, 
regardless of whether countries involved share any economic linkages. Moreover, the 
economic reasoning implies the identification of which debtors were subject to non-
fundamental spillover.   
Our work relates also with the literature on relationship lending. When a borrower 
gets in trouble, this has an adverse reputational effect on her relational financial 
intermediary. This reputational effect arises precisely because there is a well-establish 
borrower-lender relationship. Relations, which help alleviating adverse selection and 
hidden action problems, also produce contagion. 
The idea that relationships reduce the costs of gathering and processing debtor 
specific information is presented in the relationship lending literature. In Rajan [1992] and 
Petersen and Rajan [1994] repeated borrower-lender interaction alleviates informational 
problems as lenders acquire soft information on the borrower’s project. In Boot and 
Thakor [1994], Bolton and Scharfstein [1980] and Carrasco and De Mello [2006] 
relationships work as disciplining devices to mitigate hidden action problems. Empirical 
evidence supporting these proposition abounds (see Berger and Udell [1995], Hoshi, 
Kashyap and Scharfstein [1991], Aoki and Dinç [2000] among others). Although the 
relationship considered here is not direct lending, the results of the relationship lending - 6 - 
literature apply in indirect lending setting as well, since the payoff of a financial 
intermediate engaged in a relationship is connected to the ex-post behavior of the debtor. 
For instance, if the debtor fails and falls in disgrace, the intermediary suffers a payoff loss 
from not being able to promote future bond issues of the defaulter. Or it may have its 
reputation tainted, resulting in profitability decrease of other sovereign debt initial public 
offerings.  
In the light of this reasoning, recent work on corporate Initial Public Offerings 
(IPOs) underlines the importance of credibility of both issuer and underwriter in 
explaining the success of IPOs. CFOs surveyed by Brau and Fawcett [2006] report that, 
when choosing the underwriter, they care more about the intermediary’s reputation and 
expertise than other aspects such as market-making, pricing and valuation promises and 
fee structures. In the same fashion, Krigman, Shaw and Womack [2000], find that the 
firms’ decision to switch underwriter is more based on underwriter’s prestige than on the 
poor performance of previous IPOs. Carter and Manaster [1990] argue that, by choosing  
more prestigious underwriters, firms reduce the benefits of investors to gather firm-
specific information, therefore reducing the number of informed investors and the IPO’s 
underprice level (see Carter, Dark and Singh [1998] for empirical evidence on this topic). 
This paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it identifies and tests for 
an undocumented channel of non-fundamental spillovers. Second, it adds on an empirical 
literature on how the financial markets institutional structure, in my case, the existence of 
relationships, can explain shock propagation among different economies.  
 
III. The peripheral London market for sovereign debt 
 
Operating since the 1820s, the London market for sovereign debt was, until the 
World War I, the most important in terms of volume of resources invested and variety of 
borrowers, even though it faced from the early 1870s increasing competition from other 
European continental bourses (such as Paris and Berlin), and, towards the end of the 19
th 
century, from the New York Stock Exchange. Feis [1964, pp. 27] estimates that in 
December 1913, British investment on government bonds amounted ₤ 1.1 billion, 
representing approximately one third of total overseas British investment. This proportion 
was higher in the late XIX century.   - 7 - 
The London sovereign debt market can be divided in three segments, according to 
the regulation of the market and to the level of financial development of its participants: 
colonies and British dominions, financially developed borrowers, and the peripheral 
market. These segments had different modus operandi regarding debt underwriting and, 
more importantly, borrowers in different segments had different risk statuses.  We focus 
on the peripheral segment, where relationships between countries and London 
intermediaries played a major role in transmitting information to market participants, most 
likely because in the peripheral segment, moral hazard and information asymmetry issues 
were particularly acute, enhancing the relevance of the monitoring role of intermediaries. 
Finally, focusing in that group permits us to maintain an some  level of homogeneity 
among the debtors in our sample.  
Even though this market segmentation was except for the case of colonies and 
dominions, informal, the financial press of the period adopted it, strengthening the idea 
that financial assets of these groups were perceived by investors as having different status. 
Quite tellingly, both The [London] Times and the Investors’ Monthly Manual (IMM), 
when discussing the financial events and bond quotations, classified countries according 
to this categorization.
1  
The bonds of British dominions and other colonies were under a very specific 
regulation. Through the Colonial Stock Act of 1877 and its revision in 1900, the British 
government maintained a tough control upon the colonial debt issues, imposing 
safeguards to borrowers as the prohibition of the borrower to create legislation contrary to 
the British investors and total compliance with any British court decision in legal cases 
pursued by bondholders (Feis [1964], Flandreau [2005]). For example, Indian 
Government loans were controlled directly by the British Parliament. Regarding financial 
matters, colonial and British dominions were officially separated in two categories: 
colonies and responsible (but not autonomous) dominions. Until the 1880, almost all loan 
issues of these two categories were handled by the Office of Crown Agents or the Bank of 
England. The latter took care of several New Zealand, Western Australia, and South 
Australasia issues. After that date, the Office of Crown Agents became administratively 
independent of the British government and self responsible governments could no more 
issue loans through it, although colonies continued largely to use its services (Sunderland, 
[1999]). Participation of regular financial intermediaries was allowed for colonies 
                                                 
1 The IMM was the main publication of the London Stock Exchange.  - 8 - 
classified as having responsible government, but in most of cases, those dominions used 
domestic banks with London connections (Davis and Galman, [2001, pp. 177]). 
Moreover, the revision of the Colonial Stock Act in 1990 made possible to trustees, 
supervisors of investment funds with high transparency standards, to deal with domain 
stocks (Stewart, [1938]). In general, colonial and dominions bonds were considered a less 
risky investment as debtors were subject to British surveillance.  
The second category, the financially developed countries, contained sovereigns as 
France, Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, United States, among others. 
Starting in the 1880s, after having developed mature internal financial markets and as the 
volume of international business in their currencies increased, these debtors were able to 
issue most (and in some cases all) of their debt internally, and use the London market only 
as secondary
2. Therefore, for this category, long lasting relationships with London 
financial intermediaries did not exist. Furthermore, because countries in this segment 
were economically developed, less prone to political turmoil, and located, except the 
United States, in Continental Europe
3, the purchase of their bonds were viewed as a 
sounder investment, and the level of information available on their financial standings 
were higher. These countries were, for instance, subject of continuous press coverage.  
The peripheral market encompassed the rest of the governments that used the 
London market for funding their ventures or budgetary needs. It included almost all Latin 
America, some Eastern European states, Asian and African countries, as well as less 
reputable Western European borrowers as Portugal, Spain, and Italy. Contrary to the 
colonial market, this segment was not regulated in any meaningful way and, differently 
from the category of financially developed debtors, most of its participants did not have a 
high degree of economic development, political stability, and trustworthy official means 
of information disclosure of fiscal and commercial statistics.  Moreover, most participants 
of the peripheral market were far away from London, increasing the cost of accessing 
country-specific information.  
                                                 
2 Some peripheral countries (Brazil, Argentina, and Russia) had, at some point before the World War I, 
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these sovereigns.  
3 Although they sound developed, Norway and Sweden had neither a fully developed financial system 
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negotiated in the main continental bourses. Russia, despite of its great military power, was in the same 
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In the majority of cases, after 1860
4, two kinds of financial intermediaries were 
used by the peripheral countries to float their issues in London: merchant banks and joint-
stock banks. Merchant banks were the term used to describe large private investment 
institutions with high reputation, which practically monopolized the market of foreign 
debt underwriting until the 1860s.  In fact, the core business of merchant  banks was 
foreign bonds and railways issues. As an illustration the prevalence of merchant banks, 
between 1815 and 1904 the two main British merchant banks, the N. M. Rothschild and 
Sons Limited (hereinafter Rothschilds) and the Barings Brothers & Co. (hereinafter 
Barings), participated in the issue of no less than 205 government bonds, totaling 
approximately ₤ 2 billion (Davis and Galman, [2001, pp. 167-68]). Most of these issues 
occurred after 1870. Towards the end of the century, merchant banks faced increasing 
competition from joint-stock banks, which were mainly British-owned overseas 
intermediaries specifically created to finance trade between Britain and some specific 
country or region. For example, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation 
handled almost all Chinese issues between 1880 and 1914.  In the same way, the Imperial 
Ottoman Bank (formed by British and French capital) took over the flotation of Turkish 
debt, mainly after the establishment of the international financial control in Turkey during 
the 1880s (Wynne [1951]).  
As underwriters, merchant banks were responsible for tasks, some rather 
bureaucratic as handling subscriptions, making coupon payments. Other tasks were more 
substantial, such as acting as trustees for the bondholders and issuing a prospectus. A 
typical prospectus included detailed information about the terms of the loan (the currency 
of denomination, the coupon, payment dates), information about the specific destination 
of the proceedings of the loan (if any), and about the country in general. In appendix 1, we 
show (parts of) the prospect of the six per cent £1,000,000 loan issued by the Republic of 
Salvador (nowadays El Salvador) in 1908. This prospect is very illustrative, bringing 
detailed balance of payment information about the country, information about the market 
of its main export crop (coffee), and about its relations with neighbors. Interestingly it 
states explicitly the presence of a representative of the trustees, and relations with the 
government of Salvador. 
 
                                                 
4 In the early stages of the market, between 1820 and 1860, many commercial companies with business 
abroad were in charge of issuing debt of foreign sovereigns, especially those from outside Europe (see 
Marichal [1988] for some Latin American examples).  - 10 - 
In the peripheral market, several major countries established long lasting relations 
with a financial intermediary or with an international syndicate of banks (normally when 
the country issued debt concurrently in more than one European bourse). These 
relationships were observed to the public as the debtors repeatedly selected the same 
intermediary as agents for sovereign initial public offers. By January 1890, 10 out 26 
peripheral countries with more than one bond listed had 50% or more of their outstanding 
debt had been issued by the same intermediary. These relational debtors had more than 
50% of total peripheral debt negotiated in London.
5 Table I displays, for January 1890, 
the proportion of central government’s outstanding debt issued by each countries’ main 
underwriter. Excluding debtors that were on default or whose bonds were issued (or had 
their clauses changed) as a result of debt settlements, only Russia had less then 50% of 
their outstanding debt floated by the same intermediary. Later on in the 1890s , however, 
Russia would have way more than 50% of her debt dealt in Lombard Street issued by one 
single merchant bank, the Rothschilds.
6 
 
Table I – Proportion of outstanding debt issued by the main underwriter 
      








Amount of outstanding debt (in pounds) in 
January 1890 issued by the main underwriter 
(percentage of the total outstanding debt) 
Argentina 6  2  9,648,800  (62%) 
Brazil 8  8    32,072,994  (100%) 
Chile 4  2  8,163,200  (87%) 
China 4  4  3,612,100  (100%) 
Greece 5  4  15,319,180  (95%) 
Hungary 3  3  64,816,700  (100%) 
Italy 4  1*  157,176,484  (97%) 
Norway 3  3  6,362,100  (100%) 
Portugal 1*  1*  46,573,560  (100%) 
Rússia 17  5  35,932,739  (39%) 
Sweden 3  3  8,831,780  (100%) 
Sources: Investors Monthly Manual (IMM), January 1890 and The [London] Times (several issues). 
Number of bonds negotiated in London refers to loans listed by the IMM. The underwriter(s) was(were) 
                                                 
5 Bonds were listed at the Investors Monthly Manual. The Investor Monthly Manual includes a list of foreign 
loans (and their outstanding amount) of all peripheral countries considered in this study, although, for a few 
countries, some minor loans (as some provincial and municipal loans) were not displayed. Therefore, the 
London bonds’ total outstanding debt, for these countries, is underestimated by a small amount.   
6 In January 1891, the proportion of outstanding Russian debt floated through the Rothschilds reached 67%, 
totaling ₤ 91 million (Investors Monthly Manual, January 1891). - 11 - 
determined, for each loan, by inspecting the prospectuses of the issues published on The [London] Times. 
The main underwriter refers to the underwriter which took part in issuing the majority of a country's debt. 
We attributed a loan to the main underwriter in the cases in which it was not the only one responsible for 
that issue (multiple underwriters).  Data on outstanding debt is also from IMM, January 1890, (pp. 8-12). 
We excluded countries that were in default in 1890 or whose outstanding bonds were floated (or had its 
original clauses modified) as the result of debt renegotiations agreements with bondholders (Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Egypt, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, San Domingo, Spain, 
Turkey, and Uruguay) and debtors that had only one loan listed by the IMM (Hawaii, Japan, and 
Venezuela). Only federal loans were considered. * represents a series of perpetuities emissions, all with 
the same interest rate, which are listed as one bond by the IMM.  
 
When investing their money in the peripheral market, the average investor faced 
significant uncertainty about borrowers’ financial soundness. In fact, the history of the 
peripheral market is, for most of its debtors, a tale of defaults and debt renegotiations. 
From the early 1820s to the eve of the First World War, major debtors such as Mexico, 
Argentina, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Egypt as well as small players such as Santo 
Domingo, Honduras, Paraguay, Colombia, Uruguay, Liberia, and Venezuela were part, 
for long periods of time, of the vast list of defaulters.  This made the informational 
importance of underwriting all the more important. 
Moreover, the process of debt renegotiation was often complex and in many cases 
took decades to be concluded. The case of Mexico is illustrative. Following its 
independence, Mexico, in 1824 and 1825, floated in London two loans totaling ₤ 6.4 
million.  By 1827, the country, depleted by civil war, defaulted on its external obligations. 
Then, a series of short lived arrangements with bondholders took place, each of them 
involving bond conversions followed by new debt repudiations, and a definitive 
settlement was reached only in 1886, 59 years after the first default.
7 Table II shows, for a 
sample of peripheral defaulters the length of time between default and the final settlement. 
The longer it takes for a settlement, the higher the indirect costs for the bondholders, 
usually represented by expenses incurred with lawyers, missions to survey the financial 
standing of the defaulters, communication among bondholders to ensure coordination, 
design of new contracts, among others.  
                                                 
7 Portugal is another example. After the 1837 default, 19 years were necessary for the consolidation of a 
settlement which was honored by the government. The settlement was followed by a series of loans (issued 
in London, Berlin and Paris) summing up to ₤ 78.8 million. Another default took place in January 1892 and 
the new rounds of renegotiation lasted ten years - 12 - 
Table II - Periods of Debt Renegotiations 
Country   Periods of Debt renegotiation 
Argentina‡  1893-1898 
Brazil±  1898 
1826-1873 
1879-1896  Colombia‡ 
1900-1905 
1874-1885 
1895-1897  Costa Rica‡ 
1901-1911 
1826-1854       Ecuador‡ 
1868-1914* 
Egypt†  1876-1882 
1828-1855 
1876-1888  Guatemala‡ 
1894-1913 
1824-1878  Greece† 
1893-1898 
1827-1867 
1872-1897  Honduras‡ 
1900-1914* 
1827-1886  Mexico† 
1875-1890 
Liberia‡  1874-1898 
1827-1874 
1894-1895  Nicaragua‡ 
1911-1912 
1874-1885  Paraguay‡ 
1892-1895 
Peru†  1825-1849 
1837-1856  Portugal† 
1892-1902 
1828-1859  Salvador‡ 
1898-1899 
San Domingo†  1872-1888 
1823-1851 
1871-1876  Spain‡ 
1898-1902 
Turkey†  1874-1881 
1876-1883  Uruguay‡ 
1892 
1826-1841 
1847-1880  Venezuela‡ 
1898-1902 
Source: †Wynne[1951], ‡Anual Reports of the Council of Foreign Bondholders (1914), and ±Abreu[2002]. Periods of Debt Renegotiation 
starts when the country interrupted full contractual service and ends when a debt settlement was reached and sustained in the following three 
years. *Agreement was not reached when the WWI began.  - 13 - 
Given the absence of international monitoring agencies and the difficulties in 
gathering country specific-information
8, moral hazard was a pervasive problem. A large 
number of prospectuses indicated an intended employment of the resources, but examples 
of diversion abound (see Wynne [1951] for a comprehensive exposition of some of these 
cases). The 4% Greek Monopoly loan is but one example. Although the prospectus stated 
that the proceedings would be applied to meet maturing debt obligations,, around one 
third of the loan’s revenues were spent in the construction of three ironclads (Levandis 
[1944, pp. 68]). The contractors of this construction were connected to the Comptoir 
d’Escompte, the French underwriter of the loan. In the same fashion, the Greek 
government applied only one third of the “Piraneus-Larissa Railway loan of 1890” 
proceedings to the construction of the mentioned railway. It was all but impossible for an 
investor in London learn all this information. 
It was also common that prospectuses of sovereign’s public offers of peripheral 
loans bonds contained pledges of specific governmental revenues to be used to debt 
payment. In many cases, these guaranties were not fulfilled. For example, the Turkish 
loans of 1858 and 1862 pledged some customs duties and taxes on tobacco and salt, 
among other sources of public revenue. According to loans’ prospectuses, there should be 
an external commission to monitor the use of the revenues. Not only the same revenues 
were pledged in subsequent loans, but the promised monitoring commission had no 
effective power to supervise the collection of the pledged revenues. In fact, the 
supervision of these revenues was carried out by the Imperial Ottoman Bank, the Turkish 
relational intermediary in London.  
Notwithstanding the turbulence of 1870-1914 period, when a series peripheral 
countries defaulted de facto actions of the British Government to recover bondholders’ 
losses were scarce. First, as occurs nowadays, sovereign debt contracts were subject to 
limited enforceability. The posture of the British legal system towards defaulters and the 
problem of limited enforceability was a frustration among bondholders associations, as it 
is expressed by 1873 Annual Report of the Council of Foreign Bondholders (pp. 68),  
 
                                                 
8 For example, the first fiscal Turkish budget was released in 1862, eight years after the first Turkish 
international loan. Nonetheless, until the establishment of external control in 1881, Wynne [1951, pp. 416] 
points out they were remarkably untrustworthy: “Public accounts, in the proper sense of the term, scarcely 
existed and estimates of revenue and expenditure were hopeless unreliable”  
   - 14 - 
“The practice of the English Courts, both of Equity and Common Law, 
has been uniformly in favour of the privileged exemption of Sovereign 
States in all matters of private contract. There is no recognized 
international tribunal to which such differences can be referred, (…), 
even assuming that these difficulties were overcome, and a possibility 
existed of obtaining a formal judicial decision upon the matters in 
dispute, there would remain the further, and practically insuperable 
difficulty, of executing the process of the Court.”. 
 
Besides the legal enforceability problem, the British government was not regularly 
prone to use its military power to bring debt claims to a settlement. Tomz [2006], 
studying a large dataset on wars, threats of conflicts, and defaults after the 1850s, and 
matching these data with Foreign Office diplomatic correspondence, indicates that the 
British military power was rarely used primarily to protect bondholders’ interests. Even in 
the most famous case of military debt collection, Venezuela at the beginning of the 20
th 
century, pressure by bondholders was not the primary concern.
9  
The cases in which the British government did participated or support, alone or 
along with the other European powers (France, Germany, Italy and Russia) in the 
establishment of international control over the public finance of defaulters were again 
motivated by geopolitical concerns, not bondholders’ interests (Feis, [1964, pp 83-84]). 
This was the case of the Middle East and Balkans regions. In the late part of the XIX 
century, external control was imposed on Egypt, Turkey, Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria.   
The Greek financial crisis in the 1890s is also representative of the unwillingness 
of the British Government to interfere openly to protect bondholders unless there existed 
geopolitical concerns. After default took place in 1893, during the next 4 years, the 
renegotiation of Greek debt was left to British private associations. British Government 
                                                 
9 In 1901, when a new Venezuelan government suspended debt payments, British and German navies 
initiated a blockade and engaged in war against the defaulter. In a few months, Venezuela was defeated and 
forced to reach a new agreement with the bondholders. A closer look into the diplomatic correspondence and 
the timing of events shows that the British display of power was motivated mainly by the fact the 
Venezuelan military units had, in several occasions under the new government, seized British property and 
invaded colonial territories. Moreover, the current civil war led to pillage of British property in the country.  
In fact, in the last British ultimatum before the beginning of the hostilities, bondholder’s claims ranked last 
(see Tomz [2006] and Marichal [1988] to a comprehensive description of this event). - 15 - 
only took a strong position regarding the Greek default after Greece engaged in a 
disastrous war with Turkey over Crete. The fast capitulation of the Greek army led the 
debtor to urge for the mediation of the Powers and depletion of Greek bargaining power. 
Eventually, as a result of the six powers’ (England, Russia, France, Germany, Italy, 
Austria-Hungary) mediation, Greece surrendered most of the control over its finances and 
partial control over its monetary policy. Although protection of bondholder’s interest was 
an issue in the British intervention, it was not the driving force. In fact, the harsh position 
taken by Germany, with threatened military action to assure a fast debt renegotiation, 
willingness that was perceived by the British government as prone to bring instability to 
the region, was the key concern of the British Foreign Office. Such a view was shared by 
the Russian Foreign Minister. The British Ambassador in St. Petersburg stated that “the 
action of Germany, in subordinating a question of such international importance to the 
interests of her bondholders subjects was, in [Russian Foreign Minister’s] opinion, 
greatly to be regretted”(Correspondence on the Affairs of the Southeastern Europe 
(C.A.S –E.E.) Pt. 178 No. 20 Foreign Office cited on Wynne [1951], pp. 315).    
In Latin America, the rule was never direct intervention (Feis [1964], pp. 108). 
Even diplomatic pressure was not often employed as an instrument to settle debt claims in 
the region. Tomz [2006], using a sample of Foreign Office correspondence with 
bondholders in the period 1823-53, shows that the British government refused to get 
involved in 88% of the bondholder’s requests to interfere in their favor in debt-related 
complaints against Latin American states.  
Even the settlement of the Argentine failure in 1890, which led to the bankruptcy 
of the Barings Brothers, a major British Merchant bank, and jeopardized the stability of 
the British financial sector, was left to bondholders’ private associations
10. A final 
settlement for the Argentine debt was reached only in 1898.  
Without any guarantee of protection by the British Government in cases of default 
or diversion in the promised use of resources, bondholders resorted to the establishment of 
their own private associations. The most important one was the Council of Foreign 
Bondholders, initiated in 1868. Its main goal was to ensure coordination among 
bondholders aiming to increase their bargain power in processes of debt renegotiations. 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
10 In 1 November, the head of the Baring Brothers, the main underwriter of Argentina, announced to the 
Bank of England that he, given the Argentina moratorium and the fact that the bank’s vault was full of 
Argentine papers, could not guarantee the payments to investors. A short lived bank run followed. The Bank - 16 - 
One of the goals of the Corporation was the diffusion of information on debtors to 
investors. Under the Council’s initiative, a enormous library on foreign governments’ 
affairs were constituted, general informative meetings were held, press communications 
were released, and representatives were sent to debtors to investigate in loco their 
financial conditions (Mauro and Yafeh [2003]). Nevertheless, these actions aiming to 
raise the level of information of bondholders were implemented mostly during the process 
of debt renegotiations, i.e, after a country felt in disgrace.   
These examples show persuasively that bond issued at the peripheral market had 
no implicit guarantee by her Majesty Government, and the securities carried the countries´ 
sovereign risk. This is very important for our purposes because, were bonds backed, albeit 
informally by the British government, underwriter would not be important “information 
brokers”, and there would be no reason for informational contagion to occur. 
As expected, the British investor priced the risk of peripheral debtors accordingly. 
For issues of bonds outstanding in January 1890, whose initial price is listed in the 
Investors Monthly Manual of that month (79 emissions), the price offered to the public to 
the purchase of a 100-pounds security ranged from 52 (5% Turkish Defense Loan) to 100 
(Orange Free State 6% Loan of 1884) The average initial price was 84.6 (median 86.5), 
implying that bondholders normally demanded high promised high yields. Nonetheless, as 
suggested by the economic literature, the observable relationship could influence the 
evaluation of the assets either as these relations constituted monitoring devices or since 
the relationship could signal to investors the higher level of soundness of the debtor. The 
next section outlines the operation of the relationships, showing how the existence of 
them allowed the relational intermediaries to obtain, at a reduced cost, country-specific 
information and be more efficient in monitoring their clients.  
 
IV. The workings of the merchant bank – country relationships  
 
By engaging in relationships, the financial intermediary reduced the marginal cost 
of gathering country-specific information on peripheral debtors, and enhanced its ability 
to monitor and advise them. These scale economies were both derived directly, by the 
intermediary access to the government accounts, and indirectly, by personal connections 
                                                                                                                                                   
of England and the Rothschilds led a bailout, and a new Baring Brothers was formed as a joint-stock bank 
(Wirth [1893]).  - 17 - 
with governments representatives, and local firms with which  the intermediary also did  
business.  
Because it was normally responsible for coupon payments and debt amortization 
operations (Borchard [1951, pp. 21]), either by drawing bonds for redemption at par or by 
buying bonds in the market, the underwriter had a direct source of hard information on the 
debtor financial standing. The country was obliged to provide the underwriter with the 
resources necessary to perform debt payments in advance. Therefore, any delay or 
difficulties met by the borrower in fulfilling these advances were known by the bank in 
advance. In cases of when a government faced difficult times, it could try to resort to short 
term advances the market was not aware of, but the intermediary knew about.
11 A 
relational intermediary, by dealing with the majority of a country’s loans, had a 
comprehensive picture of the short-term financial conditions of the debtor. The 
relationship between Brazil and Rothschilds exemplifies the importance of government 
accounts as a direct channel of hard information. This passage, from the report of the 
committee to enquire into the organization of the N. M. Rothschild and Sons Limited 
Accounts, in 18 November 1908, is illustrative:  
 
“[The Brazilian Account] shows the amount standing to the credit of the 
Brazilian government, and the amounts debited for dividends and for 
sinking funds charges. The account is balanced at the end of each month 
and a copy is sent to the government. It contains also a record of the 
installments received on account of each loan…” (quoted by 
Flores[2007]). 
 
In some cases, beyond obtaining hard information directly from the country’s 
account, the intermediary had direct control of the government’s main sources of revenue. 
The Imperial Ottoman Bank assumed control over the 1858 and 1862 pledged revenues 
years before international intervention (Wynne [1951]).  In the same fashion, negotiations 
of the 1887 Greek “Monopoly” loan resulted in the establishment of a firm in charge of 
collecting and remitting pledged revenues directly to the agents of the loan (a syndicate 
formed by French banks and the British Merchant bank C. J. Hambro and Sons, the Greek 
relational underwriter in London).  The new company, called Société de Regie de 
Monopoles de Grèce, was headed by bank’s representatives (Levandis [1944, pp. 69]).  - 18 - 
Intermediaries also acquired privileged information as new loans agreements were 
negotiated. The amount raised, the initial price, the risk-sharing scheme (i.e., whether the 
intermediary would hold the bonds in the event of undersubscription), and the guarantees 
to be pledged (if any) were the result of general market conditions, the financial situation 
of debtor and competition among banks to get the contract. When debtor’s situation or the 
general market conditions were worse, the intermediary’s ability to impose safeguard 
clauses and financial advice improved. Therefore, it was crucial to loan contract’s design 
that the government released at least some information, and the intermediary made efforts 
to verify them. Sequential loan contracts both reduced the cost of acquiring information 
about the countries and increased the intermediary’s payoff from acquiring this 
information.     
Soft information on the government’s long-run situation, including political, 
commercial, and financial perspectives, was obtained mainly by the bank managers’ 
personal networking. These connections varied from close relations with government 
officials and commercial firms that had business in the country, The latter were 
potentially interested in how the proceedings of the loan have been applied.  
Bulgaria was an example of the construction of such connections. Following 
becoming independent from the Ottoman Empire in 1878, Bulgaria debuted as a debtor 
issuing a series of bonds in 1889, 1892, and 1896. In 1902, 1904, and 1907 in Paris (and 
other European bourses) through a syndicate led by Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas 
(Paribas), a French investment bank. The negotiations leading to this series of bonds 
issues included the appointment of a “money doctor” in Bulgaria. Although formally a 
“bondholders’ representative”, the “money doctor” was appointed by the Paribas. After 
his nomination was accepted by the French Government, he was sent to Bulgaria with 
powers to control taxes revenues and veto powers on monetary and fiscal policies. As 
Avramov [2003] reports “the bulk of his [the delegate] correspondence was not with the 
bondholders, but with the Paribas headquarters. His personal promotion and numerous 
regalia were directly dependent on Paribas”. This example illustrates how the 
underwriter gained access to privileged information through a hands-on process , which 
included building a network of personal contacts by placing a representative inside the 
issuer’s government. The disclosure of such information to final investors was at the 
intermediary’s discretion. Portugal is another good example. In 1898, a Portuguese 
                                                                                                                                                   
11 In fact most times the underwriter provided these advances - 19 - 
official revealed to Crédit Lyonnais how his government managed to cook its financial 
statements (Flandreau, [1988]).   
Since the beginning of his relationship with Brazil, back in the 1820s, the 
Rothschilds built a wide network of agents to supply the bank with intelligence on 
Brazilian commercial and financial markets. Until the 1850s, Samuel, Phillips & Co. was 
the main commercial agent of the Rothschilds in the country. For example, the 
correspondence displays the latest information on the Brazilian border conflicts with 
Argentina during the 1820s (Rothschilds Archives, RAL XI/28/215). Another critical 
piece of information that the Rothschilds obtained through Samuel, Phillips & Co. to 
Rothschilds was data on Brazilian commodity exports.  The information gathering process 
also involved a considerable exchange of letters between the head of the bank, Nathan M. 
Rothschilds and the Brazilian ministers in London. 
 Finally, the relations between Brazil and the Rothschilds also involved private 
benefits. Baron do Penedo, Brazilian minister in London from 1855 to 1889 received 
personal investments advice and some 200,000 pounds in gifts from N. M. Rothschild and 
Sons Limited (Shaw [2005]).
12 
Just as information gathered through relationships was a strategic asset to the 
bank, the decision to disclose it was also a strategic variable to the intermediary. For 
example, if a relational country was under financial distress, but the intermediary, using 
its privileged information, believed that the distress was temporary and bankruptcy could 
be averted (for example, if the intermediary believed the distress was caused by a 
temporary external shock), the optimal behavior of the intermediate could involve not 
revealing in full the current situation of the debtor bondholders, who, in case of they had 
this information, could be more pessimist than the bank and did not will to provide 
additional financial support necessary for the debtor sustain its obligations during the 
turmoil.  
In the two episodes of financial distress studied here, Greece in 1893 and Brazil in 
1898, differ in terms of the behavior of the relational underwriter regarding information 
disclosure to the public.  In the Brazilian case, when the funding loan agreement was 
made public, it was accompanied by the publication of two short letters between the 
Brazilian president, Campos Salles, and Nathan Rothschild. In these letters, the new 
                                                 
12 The Baron de Penedo was the main negotiator of the 1858 contract under which the Rothschilds became 
the exclusive underwriters of Brazilian debt. See Shaw [2005]. The Brazil-Rothschilds deal is described in 
further detail below. - 20 - 
Brazilian government promised to adopt the economic measures specified in the funding 
loan agreement, which were targeted at reducing the amount of fiat money in circulation. 
In contrast, when Hambro was negotiating during the negotiation the 1893 funding loan 
with Greece, a British official was sent with orders to elaborate a report on the financial 
standings of the country. The trip of this envoy was common knowledge to the market, 
and the contents of his findings were released before the funding loan was announced. In 
fact, in the Brazilian case, the funding loan scheme was carried out as planned, suggesting 
that the country suffered a liquidity problem. Shortly after that, the Greek funding loan 
arrangement was aborted and a complete default followed, suggesting that Greece faced 
insolvency. Solvency versus liquidity may account for the different attitudes taken by the 
two relational intermediaries in these episodes. 
The intermediary’s leverage in imposing conditionality increased with the 
knowledge the she had about the debtor’s affairs, especially when the country was in 
distress. Bondholder’s associations used retaliatory actions (attempts to prevent new 
issues by the defaulter’s in the London Stock Exchange were the most common, albeit 
usually unsuccessful, actions). On the other hand, relational intermediaries, in their role of 
advising the debtor on the current London market’s conditions and maintaining short 
terms lines of credit, could try to impose conditionalities on a regular basis, during the 
normal operation of the relationships (Flandreau [2003, pp. 33]). However, relational 
underwriters’ ability to influence debtors was partial, and varied with the degree of 
competition among banks, as suggested by the relationship lending literature (Petersen 
and Rajan [1995]).
13  
Even exclusive underwriters, who faced little competition, were unable to impose 
their will in several occasions. A particularly illustrative example is Brazil in the 1890s, 
when the financial situation worsened steadily. Despite several attempts, the Rothschilds 
were unsuccessful in convincing the Brazilian president to lease the Estrada de Ferro 
Central do Brasil as a mean to raise funds (Abreu [1994]).  
Rather important for our purposes, the market recognized the existence of relations 
as monitoring devices. In some occasions, bondholder’s complaints were addressed not to 
                                                 
13 For example, Argentina had access to European financial markets at surprisingly good terms even after 
1885, when it was noticeable that her macroeconomic fundamentals were deteriorating. Flores [2007] argues 
that Argentina’s position was strenghened by the fact that the Baring Brothers, Argentina’s main underwriter 
in London, faced significant competition from French and German houses. Between 1881 and 1889, Barings 
issued ₤ 42 million of Argentinean debt in London, of which 20 million were floated in 1888. - 21 - 
sovereign’s representatives in London, but to the issuing houses. This was the case of the 
Italian loan of 1881:   
 
“In July, 1881, a prospectus of the Italian Government 5 per cent loan 
for £14,600,000 was issued by Messrs. Baring Brothers and Co., in 
conjunction with Messrs. C. J. Hambro and Sons. 
Letters were at once addressed to them, bringing to their notice the fact 
that the amount of income tax the Italian Government intended to place 
upon the Coupons of the Bonds of this new Loan held by external 
holders, had not been stated, and referring to the treatment of the 
Coupons of the Sardinian (1851) 5 per cent loan which had been 
subjected to an income tax of 13’20 per cent, although the bonds had 
expressly declared them exempt from taxation. The reply received from 
the Agents for the issue of the Loan conveyed a communication from the 
Ministry of the Treasury that there was no question of imposing any 
further tax than the income tax of 13'20 per cent, at present chargeable 
(Annual Report of the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, 1881, 
pp.51)”. 
 
The Council of Foreign Bondholders, through a private letter to Nathan 
Rothschild, discussed with the bank its opinions on the terms of the funding loan arranged 
with the Brazilian government in 1898.  
Furthermore, evidence from the financial press at the time support the hypothesis 
that investors took into account the existence of relationships when making investment 
decisions. The following passage, from the Investors Monthly Manual, appeared right 
after the announcement of the Brazilian funding loan:  
  
“At one time investors were justified in the robust faith they reposed in 
the princes of Finance, who invited their subscriptions to foreign loans; 
but that faith was rudely shaken by the breakdown in Argentine and the 
collapse of the Barings and Murrieta, and it is not likely to be restored 
by the Brazilian experience, with which Messrs. Rothschild are more 
particularly concerned. […] Surely the time has arrived when the 
investing classes should think for themselves, and not to follow blindly - 22 - 
whoever chooses to lead them, whether Rothschilds or Barings, 
Parmatos or Hooleys” (Investors Monthly Manual, June 1898, pp. 6) 
 
The workings of the underwriter-country relationships, and how the market 
perceived them, motivate our conjecture that a financial crisis in a relational debtor 
revealed important information about the financial intermediary, which could be under-
investing in gathering information, failing to provide borrowers with appropriate 
incentives, giving bad policy advice, or plainly behaving opportunistically, i.e., 
underwriting debt of countries that she knew to be unsound. During the crisis, as investors 
update their priors, other borrowers with strong ties to the same bank as the distressed 
country suffer an increase in their risk premium, thus generating informational spillover. 
The next section describes the empirical strategy we follow to test the informational 
contagion hypothesis.  
 
V. Empirical Strategy   
 
Identification rests on appropriately selecting the events of financial distress. The 
Brazilian funding loan of 1898 and the Greek funding loan of 1893 are the two episodes 
that fulfill the following necessary conditions for identification: (i) the distressed country 
had a strong relationship with an underwriter; (ii) the presence of other countries with 
strong ties with the same underwriter, which form the treatment group; (iii) countries in 
the treatment group have to be geographically and economically heterogeneous; (iv) crisis 
in the original country driven (at least mainly) by internal reasons, that is, the crisis must 
be somewhat idiosyncratic to the country. 
It is self-evident that conditions (i) and (ii) need to be satisfied: it does not make 
sense to look for informational contagion when a crisis is originated in country that is not 
a relational debtor, or when there are no countries to be suffer from contaminated through 
shared underwriter.  
Conditions (iii) and (iv) are crucial for a clean interpretation of a drop in the price 
of bonds in the treatment group as evidence of informational contagion. First and 
foremost, it is not clear that a crisis originated somewhere else than the country contains 
any relevant information about her underwriter. Furthermore, if the origin in abroad, then 
chances are that bond prices of potential treatment or control countries would already be 
contaminated, preventing interpretation of the results,  - 23 - 
If countries sharing the same merchant bank also produced similar crops, or had 
strong trade ties among them, then one would expect a higher co-movement among their 
bond prices, above and beyond their co-movement with the rest of the market, especially 
following a crisis.
14 For example, a commodity price shock that affects the external 
solvency of “treated countries” can produce the results regardless of shared underwriter. 
The most famous default of 19
th century, the Argentine bankruptcy of 1890, fails 
condition (iv) because the only peripheral country that, at the time of the crash, had a 
strong relationship with the Barings was Uruguay, preventing us from separating 
informational from geographical contagion.
15 Besides that, the Argentine default, as 
mentioned in section II, led its main underwriter to bankruptcy, and caused a financial 
crisis in London, and disturbing the whole peripheral market.  
Since 1858, the merchant  bank Rothschilds was the official bankers of the 
Brazilian government in London. In 1898, 100% of the outstanding debt underwritten in 
London had been issued by this bank, which was responsible for almost all advertising of 
Brazilian securities in the market, as well as providing the English press with information 
about Brazilian economic and political conditions. The tight relationship between Brazil 
and the Rothschilds was widely known to investors. 
The Brazilian crisis had three main causes: political turmoil, loose monetary 
policy, and a commodity shock in the price of coffee, the main Brazilian exporting 
commodity. The drop in the price of coffee had a significant impact on the Brazilian 
budget since the taxes on coffee exports were the primary source of revenue to the 
Government.  
During the transition from the Empire to the Republic (1889-1898), Brazil 
experienced major political instability. Successive exchange devaluations, totaling some 
300% of the milréis-sterling rate, resulted in a massive fiscal imbalance. Spreads on 
central government loans, below 2% in the late 1880s, peaked at 4% in 1898. The sharp 
drop in coffee prices after 1895 was the final blow to the Brazilian ability to sustain its 
external payments as contracted. In March 1898, right after the Brazilian budget was 
published in the English press, Brazilian bond prices dropped roughly 15%. We assume 
                                                 
14 Increased variance disguises itself as contagion, as demonstrated by Forbes and Rigobon [2002]. More on 
this is section IV.   
15 Argentina and Uruguay, besides having cattle as they main export product, shared significant trade links. 
Triner [2001] presents a case study of contagion on Brazil originated from Argentina failure in 1890. 
Differently from our paper, this work rationalizes the co-movement of Brazilian and Argentine bond yields 
after the crisis from the fact that investors might have observed strong similarities across both economies (in 
a geographical approach). In contrastt, we selected crisis in which geographical issues were minimized. - 24 - 
that this sharp price movement determines the moment in which the market learned about 
the crisis. Prices kept falling until July 1898, when Brazil announced a funding loan 
scheme: instead of paying interest on its foreign debt, it would issue new bonds in the 
following 3 years. The amortization payments covered by the funding scheme (almost all 
the central government debt) were suspended for the following 13 years. The funding loan 
scheme was designed with the guidance of the London Rothschilds, which also were in 
charge of presenting the scheme to British investors.   
Similarly, a mix of commodity shock with internal political turmoil explains the 
Greek episode. The Greece’s history as a debtor begins in the 1820s. After several 
decades of default and tortuous debt renegotiations, Greece reappeared in the European 
markets in 1879, floating a 60,000,000 Franc loan in Paris, followed by a series of debt 
emissions placed, over the subsequent years, in London, Paris and other continental 
bourses. The underwriting of all Greek debt was performed by a syndicate of banks. The 
English partner in this syndicate was the merchant bank C.J. Hambro & Sons (hereinafter 
Hambro). In 1893, service of the Greek foreign debt represented 33% if her budgetary 
revenues (Levandis [1944]). The external balance relied heavily on the currant crop, 
whose international price had been falling since the early 1890s. In late 1892, a Greek 
bankruptcy was impeding. In order to avoid that, the Finance Minister, Chamilaoes 
Tripocoupis, engaged in negotiations with the Hambro house to raise a new loan in 
London. Levandis [1944] reports some hesitations by Hambro. The negotiations resulted 
in the agreement that an English Official, Major Law, should be commissioned to review 
the Greek financial standings. It was followed by a French advisor. The visit of the British 
expert was public knowledge, and his reports eagerly awaited and commented by the 
financial press. Law’s report disclosure in April 14, 1893 triggered a drop in Greek bond 
prices, which were further depressed by the dismissal of the Minister of Finance. A few 
weeks after those events, Greece announced a funding loan scheme.  
As mentioned above, an important similarity between the Brazilian and the Greek 
crises was the presence of a group of countries that related to the same merchant bank as 
the distressed debtor, but geographically and economically heterogeneous, with no 
relevant trade linkages among them. We decide whether a country had a strong 
relationship with a merchant bank using two pieces of information; one quantitative, the 
concentration of underwriting operations observed by the market, and on qualitative, 
based with historical records.  
For both the Brazilian and the Greek episodes of financial distress, the strategy - 25 - 
consists of comparing the dynamics of the price of the bonds between two sets of 
countries: one composed of countries that had a relationship with the same merchant bank 
as the country in distress (treatment), and one that did not have (control). The country 
under distress is always excluded. We compare both the whole distribution of prices, and 
several sample moments of the distribution, before and after the distress for the two 
groups. The next section describes how the sample was constructed, and how the groups 
defined. 
 
 VI Data and Summary Statistics 
 
We use two primary sources of data: the Investor Monthly Manual (hereinafter 
IMM), published by the London Stock Exchange from 1869 to 1926, and The [London] 
Times, the daily newspaper published since the late 18th century. The IMM contains a list 
of sovereign bonds quoted in the London Stock Exchange as well as information on the 
bonds, including information about monthly prices (opening, highest, lowest, and 
closing), the amount of the loan unredeemable, and dates of coupon payments.  The 
Times published (previous day) bond prices only if bonds that were negotiated at those 
days. The sample is defined as all bonds whose prices were published at the section Stocks 
and Shares, coupons payable in London. This criterion excludes, as discussed in section 
II, colonies and other British dominions and the financially developed borrowers. We use 
weekly data on bond prices which was gathered using the first price that appears in a 
certain week. It does occur in our sample that a bond shows no prices for the whole week, 
in which case the observation is treated as missing.  
Tables III and IV presents the size and some summary statistics on amount of 
outstanding debt in our sample of debtors for both crises. Table V shows the geographical 
distribution of the sample. In both events, the sample consists mostly of bonds issued by 
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Table III – Sample, Brazilian Episode 
Bonds whose price were published in The Times, February 1898    
  No. of borrowers  Bonds  %    
          
Total  33 90       
Countries  27  75 83.33%     
Provinces  6  16 17.78%     
Defaulted  6  16  6.67%    
Hungary, Russia, and Chile  3 15  16.67%     
Other Governments  30 75  83.33%     
          
          
  Outstanding Debt 
                Total       %     Median          Min         Max 
Total  £681,705,648   £2,386,100  £145,500  £77,587,612 
Countries  £665,747,148 97.66%  £2,972,180  £145,500 £3,660,100 
Provinces  £15,958,500 2.34%  £1,131,400  £239,400  £77,587,612 
Hungary, Russia, and Chile  £193,236,178 28.35%  £4,000,000  £528,200  £63,400,000 
Other Governments  £488,469,470 71.65%  £2,359,800  £145,500  £77,587,612 
Source: The [London] Times, Stocks and Shares, coupons payable at London. Investors Monthly Manual  for 
outstanding debt 
 
Table IV – Sample, Greek Episode    
Bonds whose price were published in The Times in February 1893    
  No. of borrowers  Bonds  %   
Total  34 84     
Countries  27  70 83.33%   
Provinces  7  14 16.67%   
Defaulted  9 14  26.47%   
Italy, Sweden, and Norway  3 9  10.71%   
Other Governments  31 75  89.29%   
  Outstanding Debt 
  Total %  Median  Min 
Total  £423,648,860   £2,006,000  £122,400 
Countries  £410,479,860 96.89%  £2,581,750  £122,400 
Provinces  £13,169,000 3.11%  £829,300  £152,600 
Sweden, Norway, and Italy  £12,488,620 2.95%  £1,697,120  £740,340 
Other Governments  £411,160,240 97.05%  £2,282,450  £122,400 
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Table V – Size and Geographical Distribution of the Sample 
   Episodes of Distress   
Episodes of 
Distress 










Argentina (central)  9  11  Bulgaria  1  2 
  Buenos Aires  2  2 Demark  - 1 
  Cordoba 1  3 Greece  - 6 
  Entre Rios  3  3 Hungary  1 1 
  Santa Fe  5  6 Italia  3  2 
Argentina (central and provincial)  20  25  Norway  3  3 
Brazil (central)  4  -  Portugal  1  1 
  São Paulo  1 - Russia  6  7 
Brazil (central and provincial)  5  -  Spain  2  2 
Chile   5  8  Sweden  3  2 
Colômbia 1  1  Turkey  9  6 
Ecuador 1  1  Total 29  33 
Paraguay 1  1       
Uruguay 1  2  Asia       
Venezuela 1  1  China  4  5 
Total   35  39  Japan 1 1 
       Total 5 6 
North and Central America       
Costa Rica  2  2  Africa       
Guatemala 2  1  Egypt  5  5 
Honduras 2  1  Transvaal  1  1 
Mexico (central)  2  3  Total 6 6 
  San Luis Potosi  1  1     
  Tucuman 1  1  Oceania       
Mexico (central and provincial)  4  4 Hawaii  1 - 
Nicarágua  1  -  Total 1 0 
San Domingo  -  1       
Total   11  14       
 
 
With the weekly bond price information from The Times, along with dates of 
coupon payment from the IMM, weekly prices are corrected for dividend payment, so that 
weekly comparisons are free of dividend payment. More precisely, the “raw” bond price 
has embodied the payment of the coupon. So, at the date of dividend payment, the coupon 
paid is  “added back” to the price of the bond, using the interest rate contracted and the 
period of payment (semester or quarter) at the original prospectus. If there is a payment on 
date t = 0, the price is corrected by subtracting the “weekly coupon payment”. Suppose a 
i%-coupon, semester-payment bond with face value price 100 has a “raw” price pt. For 
the 25 weeks following the payment week (called t = 0), the “corrected” price  t p ~  of the 
bond is: - 28 - 
                                                          ) 1 ) 1 (( 100 ~ 52 − + × − = i p p t i                                                       (1) 
 
The “corrected” price, although resembling the yield, has on important advantage: 
it assumes a zero probability of default only for the remaining weeks to next coupon, and 
not for the whole flow of income of the bond. Accounting for bond payments is 
particularly important given the high frequency of the data (weekly), the relatively short 
period of the sample (14 weeks), and the fact that dividends were typically paid every six 
or four months. In this case, dividend payments produce sharp (and undesired) 
fluctuations in prices, which have little to do with risk assessment. Information about 
coupon payments were extracted from the prospectuses published on The Times or on the 
Annuals Reports of the Council of Foreign Bondholders (for bonds issued as a result of 
debt renegotiations). 
In each crisis, data were collected for 10 weeks before the market learned about 
the distress and 4 weeks after. These periods are not arbitrary. Two criteria were used. 
First, to avoid picking confounding effects, we choose the shortest before the distress 
conditional on having confidence that we at least half of the observations from periods in 
which the market had no hint about the distress. Second, the end of the sample after the 
distress was the week in which the bond prices of the (original) distressed country stopped 
falling, signaling the end of the crisis. In both the Brazilian and the Greek cases, these 
periods were roughly 10 and 4 week. The decision about the period in which the market 
learned about the distress was based on the movement of bond prices. Figures I and II 
present the evolution of bond prices of the distressed country in both crises, and the 
definition of the tranquil and turbulent periods.  In both cases, there is a first sharp drop in 
prices.16 Additionally, there is qualitative historical evidence to support the choices. In 
the Brazilian case, it is the week selected in which the Brazilian governmental budget first 
appeared in the English press. In the Greek case, the sharp drop in bond prices occurred 
when the financial minister resigned.  
 
                                                 
16 Robustness checks were performed using slightly different periods. - 29 - 






































































Source: The [London] Times. Average bond price is computed by the arithmetic mean  the prices the 6 Brazilian Bonds 
negotiated in London. The mean was normalized to 100 in 10/1/1897 
 
Figure II: Variation in the Average Greek Bond Prices 
 
Source: The [London] Times. Average bond price is computed by the arithmetic mean the prices the 5 Greek Bonds 
negotiated in London. The mean was normalized to 100 in 12/2/1892 
 
 

















































































































































































resigns - 30 - 
the same merchant bank as the distressed ones. Differently from the empirical literature 
on relationship lending (Aoki and Dinç [2000], Berger and Udell [1995], Petersen and 
Rajan [1994], De Mello [2006]), the measure of relational strength has to be observed by 
market. Thus, we measure strength of relationship with a certain underwriter by the 
proportion of the country’s outstanding debt issued by the underwriter. In addition to this 
quantitative measure, we use historical records to corroborate the choices, or to guide 
robustness checks for the borderline cases.17 
Tables VI shows the bond issues and the characteristics of the countries that, in 
February 1898, had at least one bond issued by Rothschilds, and the proportion of 
outstanding debt issued by this merchant bank. Among countries that did have operations 
with the Rothschilds, Chile, Hungary and Russia are considered Rothschild countries. 
Two cases are borderline: The line is drawn between Russia and Turkey. Not only Turkey 
had a significantly lower proportion of Rothschild underwritten debt, but the 27.15% it 
has was split between the Rothschild and the Imperial Ottoman Bank. Furthermore, 
historical records as Feis [1962] and Wynne [1954] show, as discussed in section II, that 
Turkish main revenues had been monitored, since 1881, by an external bondholder’s 
commission. Reports of the commission were available to the public through the Annual 
Reports of the Council of Foreign Bondholders. Therefore, the monitoring role of 
Rothschild was likely to be small on this country18.  
   As having a small proportion of overall debt issued by the Rothschilds, Egypt 
was also under external intervention, therefore, we do not consider this debtor as 
belonging to the treatment group. Another dubious case was Transvaal. In this a 100% of 
the debt was issued by the Rothschild but there was only one bond issue of low amount, 
so by construction it would be concentrated.19 The other country that had Rothschild 




                                                 
17 One example is Italy in the Geek case. The quantitative measure suggests that Italy is a Hambro country in 
the Greek episode. There is, however, conflicting historical record .In the regressions, we take this into 
account by estimating the models with and without Italy. See section IV.  
18 There are historical reasons to be cautious with Russia as well. Despite the large proportion of Rothschild 
issued debt, the country and the Bristish merchant bank relationship was in dire straits over the Czar 
government’s treatment of her Jewish subject during the (broader) period of the Brazilian crisis. For this 
reason, robustness checks were performed by excluding Russia,  
19 Additionally, Transvaal could well be considered a British colony at the period. - 31 - 




in February 1898 
(British pounds) 
Proportion Issued 
By N. M. Rothschild 
& Sons 
Chile          
4.5% 1885  City Bank  745,800.00 
4.5% 1886  Rothschilds  5,604,900.00 
4.5% 1887  Rothschilds  1,089,400.00 
4.5% 1889  Rothschilds  1,484,392.00 
5% 1892  Rothschilds  1,770,400.00 
4.5% 1893  Rothschilds  582,200.00 
4.5% 1895  Rothschilds  1,988,600.00 
5% 1896  Rothschilds  4,000,000.00 
87.08% 
Hungary       
4% Gold Rentes  Rothschilds  63,400,000.00 
3% State Loan  Lloyds Bank  1,871,000.00  97.13% 
Russia      
1822  Rothschilds  4,445,735.00 
1859 3%   Thompson  2,375,300.00 
Nicolas Railway  Baring  21,256,440.00 
3% Transcaucasian 
Railway  Baring 27,312,241.00 
Cons. Series I  Rothschilds  48,459,310.00 
Cons. Series II  Rothschilds  12,485,935.00 
Cons. Series III  Rothschilds  8,221,460.00 
3.5% Bonds  Rothschilds  15,766,112.00 
4% Dvinsk and 
Vitebsk*  - 2,983,040.00 
62.37% 
Turkey      
4% 1891  Rothschilds/Imperial Ottoman Bank  6,157,920.00 
3.5% 1894  Rothschilds/Imperial Ottoman Bank  8,130,280.00 
4% Priority 1890  Imperial Ottoman Bank  7,303,240.00 
Converted Series A  Council of Administration of the Ottoman 
Public Debt  799,400.00 
Converted Series B  Council of Administration of the Ottoman 
Public Debt  7,930,300.00 
Converted Series C  Council of Administration of the Ottoman 
Public Debt  29,117,171.00 
Converted Series D  Council of Administration of the Ottoman 
Public Debt  42,384,465.00 
5% Customs loan  Barclay  5,160,320.00 
27.15% 
Egypt      
Unified 4%  Anglo-Egyptian Banking Company  55,971,960.00 
Pref. Red 5%   Bank of England  26,568,420.00 
3% Inscribed   Bank of England  2,825,160.00 
4.25% State Domain  Rothschilds  3,546,300.00 
4% Daira Sanich  Stern  6,631,600.00 
3.71% 
Spain      
1882 External  Financial Agency  77,587,612.00 
Quicksilver 1870  Rothschilds  413,000.00  0.53% 
Transvaal      
5% 1892  Rothschilds  2,500,000.00  100.00% 
Source: Amount of Loan Unredeemable: Investor's Monthly Manual (Feb. 1898). Underwriter: Bond prospectuses published by 
The Times. 
  
Table IV does the same for the Greek crisis, i.e., it displays all countries which in 1893 
had at least one bond issued by Hambro. In this case, contrary to the Brazilian one, all - 32 - 
countries that had Hambro operations had them concentrated, and all three countries had 
three issues. 
Not only Norway and Sweden had 100% of their debt outstanding by Hambro, but 
all previous issues, back to the 1870s, were also handled by this bank.   Although the three 
Italian bonds negotiated in London dated back to the 1860s, historical records allow me to 
classify this country as a Hambro one. In 1888, after the rivalry between Italy and France 
almost led to war, a press campaign against Italian securities took place in Paris. 
Geopolitical concerns motivated the German government to foster the formation of a 
syndicate of banks to sustain Italian credit. Hambro were the London partner of this 
syndicate.  This syndicate was granted exclusivity in the next Italian bond emissions in 
Europe (Feis [1964, pp. 238]). In 1880 and 1881 Italian contracted two huge loans in 
Germany and other continental bourses. Although London was not selected as a primary 
market for these emissions, Hambro was in charge of distributing bonds of these loans to 
British investors  
 
Table VII - Peripheral Countries with debt issued by Hambro in 1893 
Loans Underwriter 
Amount of Outstanding debt 
February 1893 (British 
pounds) 
Proportion Issued 
By C.J. Hambro 
Norway          
4% 1880  C.J. Hambro  1,055,120.00 
3.5% 1886  C.J. Hambro  1,697,120.00 
3% 1888  C.J. Hambro  3,525,760.00 
100.00% 
Sweden        
4% 1878  C.J. Hambro  887,840.00 
4% 1880  C.J. Hambro  5,988,000.00 
3% Bonds  C.J. Hambro  1,470,000.00 
100.00% 
      
Italy        
Sardinian 5% 1851  C.J. Hambro  740,340.00 
Irrigation 6%  C.J. Hambro  2,120,200.00 
5% Marremmana 
Raiway  C.J. Hambro  1,782,000.00 
100.00% 
Source: Amount of Loan Unredeemable: Investor's Monthly Manual (Feb. 1898)   
Underwriter: Bond prospectuses published at The Times.    
 
 
 In the Brazilian episode, the sample of bonds is divided into two groups: those 
issued by Russia, Chile and Hungary, and the rest of the market. Analogously, in the 
Greek crisis, the division is between the bonds issued by Italy, Sweden and Norway and 
the other bonds. 
As shown in Table VIII, which contains the geographical distribution of the issues - 33 - 
in the sample, the control groups in both episodes were quite heterogeneous. This is an 
important feature of the data since geographically homogenous countries would be subject 
to similar unobserved shocks that could compete with the shock of financial distress on 
the treatment group. Table VIII shows the summary statistics on prices for both crises, 
before and after the market learned about the distress. Bond prices of Rothschild 
countries, for the Brazilian episode, fell by some 5 points (4.69%) over the period. In the 
Brazilian case, the average price for the rest of the marked fell by 2%.  For the Greek 
case, the same pattern arises, but less dramatic: 2.18% fall for Hambro countries, and 
1.80% fall for non-Hambro countries. Standard errors for the raw data are, however, quite 
high, and the amount of variation in data is significantly higher in the Brazilian.  
 
Table VIII – Summary Statistics 
     Brazilian Episode  Greek Episode 
      Before 
Crisis 
During 
Crisis  ∆ (%)  Before 
Crisis 
During 
Crisis  ∆ (%) 
#Obs  165 61  79  34 
Mean  95.07 90.61  98.56 96.45  Relational 






#Obs  799 309  723 343 
Mean  67.22 66.05  67.55 66.33  Rest of the 






Source: The [London] Times Stocks and Shares 
 
 
Besides the mean, we also compute unconditional differences in estimated density 
of bond prices for the control and treatment groups before and after the episodes of 
financial distress, for the Brazilian 1898 and the Greek 1893 episodes (figures III and IV). 
For the Rothschild countries the estimated density of prices clearly shifts to the left after 
the episode. For the Greek case, although the same seems true, the shift is much less 
obvious. Both visual suggestions are confirmed in table IX.  
For the Brazilian episode, while the null hypothesis that bond prices from 
Rothschild countries were drawn from the same distribution before and after the episode 
is safely rejected, for non-Rothschild countries it is not (p- value = 29.49%).  For non-
Hambro countries, the before and after distributions are all but indistinguishable. For - 34 - 
Hambro countries, one can reject the equality of the two distributions at the 3.06% level.  
 
Figure III - Brazilian Episode: Treatment and Control Estimated 
Densities Before and After the Crisis 
 
Figure IV - Greek Episode: Treatment and Control Estimated Densities 
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Table IX - Non-parametric tests of equality of distributions 
      
Brazil Greece 
Rothschild 0.00%  Hambro  3.06% 
Non-Rothschild 29.49%  Non-
Hambro  55.96% 
 p-values  of  the  Mann-Whitney test for equality of 
distributions.  Test:  H0:  F(price|after crisis) = 




As figure III and IV indicate, for both episodes, the control groups display bond 
prices that are pretty much lower than the prices observed in the treatment group. This 
reflects the fact that the control groups contain countries in default and other debtors 
which could potentially have embodied a greater risk than bonds in the treatment groups. 
In order to transform the treatment groups as similar as possible to the control ones, I 
repeat the unconditional distributions estimates and the hypothesis tests excluding from 
the control group countries whit low bond prices. In the Brazilian episode, I excluded 
bonds that, for at least one week in the sample, were quoted bellow 60. In the Greek 
episode the line for exclusion is the same. This procedure reduces the sample to 52 bonds 
in the Brazilian episode and 53 bonds in the Greek episode. Figures V and VI, and table X 
display the results obtained and show that the main unconditional findings are not 
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Figure V - Brazilian Episode: Treatment and Control Estimated 
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Figure VI - Greek Episode: Treatment and Control Estimated Densities 
Before and After the Crisis (reduced control group) 
 
 
Table X - Non-parametric tests of equality of distributions (reduced 
control group) 
Brazil Greece 
Rothschild 0.00%  Hambro  3.06% 
Non-Rothschild 34.81% Non-
Hambro  92.09% 
 p-values  of  the  Mann-Whitney test for equality of 
distributions.  Test:  H0:  F(price|after crisis) = 
F(price|before crisis) vs H1: F (price|after crisis)  ≠ 
F(price|before crisis). 
 
IV. Empirical Model and Main Results 
 
The unit of observation is a bond (indexed by j) price at week t. For both episodes, 
the bonds of peripheral countries are partitioned into two into two mutually exclusive sets: 
those issued by countries, those issued by countries that shared a strong relationship with 
the same underwriter as the country under distress (group U), and those issued by 
countries that did not (NU).  The sample is also partitioned into two grand periods, bond 
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defined as explained in section III. If T is the whole sample period,  
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otherwise   , 0
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MERCHANTij  
We impose a simple structure of relation between prices of bonds from pairs of 
countries. In particular, we assume, for countries  U i∈  
                                               jt t i jt EPISODE p ε β β + + = 1 ) ~ log(                           (2) 
and for  NU i∈  
                                                    ) ~ log( jt i jt p ε β + =                                                (3) 
where  jt p ~  is the bond price “corrected” by formula (1). The parameter of interest is β1. 
The hypothesis test is: 
  0 :      versus 0 : 1 1 1 0 < ≥ β β H H  
that is, a crisis in one country has an adverse effect on countries that share the same 
underwriter.  
The observables determinants of bond prices (ε and  ν)  are allowed to have 
different data generating processes but we make the following unconfoundedness 
assumption: 
                    [ ] [ ] 0 | , , | = = Controls E Controls MERCHANT EPISODE E jt i t jt ε ε                (4) 
 
Unconfoundedness means that, after controlling for covariates (bond and week 
fixed-effects in our case), unobserved determinants of bond prices ( jt ε ) are mean 
independent of crisis periods (EPISODE) and sharing the same underwriter 
(MERCHANT). (4) would be violated if, for instance, there were important trade linkages 
among countries that shared the same underwriter: in this 
case [ ] 0 , 1 , 1 | < = = controls MERCHANT EPISODE E i t jt ε . For this reason, we demanded 
that episodes satisfied the rather demanding list of conditions (see section II).  
If the β1 < 0, equations (2) and (3) have the following two implications about the 
joint distribution of bond prices: 
 
Implication  1: The co-movement between bond prices of a pair of - 39 - 
countries (i,j) ∈ U should increase relative to bond prices of a pair of 
countries (i,j) ∈ NU 
 
Implication 2: The prices of bond prices from countries i  ∈  U should 
suffer a depreciation relative to bond prices in countries i ∈ NU.   
 
Implication 1 is the classical measure in the literature: contagion is measured as an 
increase in covariance. Forbes and Rigobon [2002], however, show that an increase in 
volatility produces a spurious an increase in covariance even without any contagion. In 
our notation that would mean: 
( ) ( )   0 | 1 | = > = t jt t jt EPISODE Var EPISODE Var ε ε  
Contrary to the common application in the contagion literature, increased 
covariance due to increased volatility is not problematic in our case. Since we compare 
countries in U and NU, covariance results would be biased only if: 
                ( ) ( )
() () NU i EPISODE Var NU i EPISODE Var
U i EPISODE Var U i EPISODE Var
t jt t jt
t jt t jt
∈ = − ∈ =
> ∈ = − ∈ =
, 0 | , 1 |
, 0 | , 1 |
ε ε
ε ε
    (5)  
Table VIII, while suggesting a clear picture of the mean, presents a more 
ambiguous one for the variance. Indeed, in the Brazilian episode, volatility of bond prices 
increased after crisis (standard deviation went from 15.18 to 18.24). In the Greek episode, 
however, variances stayed constant in both groups (Hambro and non-Hambro countries). 
Because of the Brazilian episode, however, we cannot dismiss (5), and thus we view 
results on the covariances between pairs of bond prices only as corroborative. 
Since episodes of financial distress were chosen to have internal, idiosyncratic, 
reasons, the only first-order feature shared by the triggering countries and the countries in 
the treatment group is the merchant bank. The shock to countries with a common 
underwriter is, therefore, as close as one get to a natural experiment (see Besley and Case 
[1994]), and the unconfoundness assumption (4) is justified, especially because we 
control for all time-invariant heterogeneity among bonds. Therefore, implication (2) can 
be consistently tested by estimating the following regression: 






j t j it T C EPISODE MERCHANT p υ β β + + + × + = ∑ ∑
= = 1 1
1 0
~ log              (6) 
where Cj is a dummy specific for bond j (J is the number of bonds in the sample). In most 
specifications we also include a set of week specific dummies Wt.  1 β , a difference-in-- 40 - 
differences coefficient, is the parameter, and an estimated negative value for  1 β  is 
interpreted as evidence of information contagion. (6) is estimated for both the mean 
(OLS) and the median (quantile regression).  
The set of bond specific dummies Cj controls for all time-invariant unobserved 
determinants of bond prices. Most importantly, these include country fixed effects that 
could correlate with having a relational underwriter, such as intrinsic risk, enough scale 
on debt, etc. Week dummies control for all shocks specific to each week but common to 
bonds (and countries). These include a generalized increase in risk aversion in the 
peripheral market (which most likely occurred during the crisis episodes), and any 
increase in the attractiveness of British bonds.  
Including week dummies and, more importantly, bond dummies among controls 
makes it more credible that assumption (4) is satisfied. Still, unobserved time-varying 
components could still produce the result, and (4) would be violated. Nevertheless, the 
characteristics of the treatment and control groups in both episodes, and historical 
evidence, suggest that this is not the case. 
 In the Brazilian episode, there are three Rothschild countries: Hungary, Russia, 
and, rather distinct from the previous two, Chile. This is an important feature because 
countries could be contaminated because similarities other than the shared underwriter. 
For instance, were the Rothschild group was composed by only Latin American countries, 
geographical similarity would rationalize the results. In the Greek episode the other 
Hambro countries were more similar: Norway, Sweden and Italy. There is, however, no 
recorded concurrent independent historical event that rationalizes a fall in Scandinavian 
bond prices (see Feis [1922], Wynne [1951] and IMMs of 1893).  
Furthermore, there is no immediate link, such as geography, between Greece and 
Norway/Sweden that could compete to rationalize the contagion. Finally, it is important to 
notice that the two episodes are distant in time, some 5 years. Since the control groups in 
both events are quite similar, if episodes were close in time, an unobserved shock to even 
a subset of countries in the control group could rationalize the results. Table XII presents 
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Table XII– Regression Results, dependent Variable: Log (Bond Price) 
  Brazilian Episode  Greek Episode 
   Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
-0.043 -0.044 -0.041 -0.030  -0.031  -0.023 
Merchant×Episode 
[0.006]*** [0.007]*** [0.006]*** [0.004]***  [0.005]***  [0.004]*** 
Week Dummies?   No Yes Yes No  Yes  Yes 
Defaulted bonds?   Yes Yes No Yes  Yes  No 
# observations  1304 1304 1304 1179  1179  1006 
R
2  0.012 0.001 0.035 0.005  0.001  0.001 
All regressions include a constant. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** = significant at 1%. ** = 
significant at 5%. *= significant at 10%. 
 
The coefficients on the interaction Merchant×Episode capture the effect of the 
contagion by shared underwriter. Bond prices among countries that shared the same 
underwriter as the country in distress fell, above and beyond the market, by some 4% and 
3% in the Brazilian and Greek episodes, respectively. In all columns standard errors 
robust to (between and within) panel heteroskedasticity are reported. Robustness to 
between panel heteroskedasticity is particularly important in light of the potential increase 
in variance in for countries i ∈ U in the Brazilian case. Columns (2), (3), (5) and (6) show 
that results are insensitive to the inclusion of week dummies are included and to exclusion 
of defaulted bonds. Table XIII has the same estimates for the median and other quantiles 
of the distribution of the log of bond prices. 
 
Table XIII - Quantile regressions, dependent variable: Log(Bond Price) 
  Brazilian Episode  Greek Episode 
 
25% 
percentile  Median  75% 
percentile 
25% 
percentile  Median  75% 
percentile 
-0.033  -0.028 -0.004    -0.005 -0.014 -0.018  Merchant×Episode 
[0.010]*** [0.014]**  [0.005]  [0.004]  [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
#  of  observations  1116  1116 1116 1006 1006 1006 
Pseudo R
2  0.956  0.944 0.927 0.945 0.945 0.926 
Bootstrapped errors in brackets (500 replications). *** = significant at 1%. **= significant at 5%. 
*=significant at 10%. Week and bond dummies included in all estimated models. 
 
The main coefficient of is again the interaction term, which captures how the 
quantiles of the distribution of bond changed differently in the treatment and non-
treatment countries, as a response to the episodes of financial distress in Brazil and 
Greece. The effect on all three quantiles is negative, as expected. The median log of bond 
price in the treatment group decreased for both episodes.  
Several robustness checks are conducted. Table XIII reports only the coefficient - 42 - 
Merchant×Episode for the linear conditional mean. The sample is restricted in several 
ways, mainly geographically. For instance, in the Brazilian case, all Latin American 
countries, including Chile, were excluded. Also, we let the beginning of the crisis as well 
as the beginning and ending of the tranquil and crisis period to vary. Finally, bonds that 
were quoted bellow 60 at least for one week in the samples were excluded. The main 
results hold.   
 
Table XIII – Robustness Checks 









t+1 -0.038  [0.006]***    -0.023  [0.004]***  Beginning of the 
tranquil period  t+4 -0.026  [0.006]***    -0.019  [0.004]*** 
t-1 -0.039  [0.006]***   -0.024 [0.003]***  Beginning of the crisis 
t+1 -0.045  [0.007]***    -0.023  [0.004]*** 
t-2 -0.038  [0.008]***   -0.031 [0.005]***  Crisis Ending 
t+4 -0.032  [0.005]***    -0.020 [0.003]*** 
Raw Price     -0.039 [0.006]***    -0.022 [0.004]*** 
Only bond prices 
greater than 60: Brazil
a  
and Greece
b    
-0.030 [0.005]*** 
 
-0.008 [0.003]***   
Fixed Effects estimates including week dummies and excluding defaulted bonds. All regressions 
include a constant. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** = significant at 1%. 
a  781 obs. (52 
bonds). 
b  754 obs. (53 bonds). 
   Brazilian  
  Merchant×Episode  Standard Deviation 
Only South America
a -0.067  [0.009]*** 
Russian and Hungary 
Neighborhood
b  -0.015 [0.005]*** 
Including Spain  -0.037  [0.006]*** 
 Greece   
  Merchant×Episode  Standard Deviation 
Greek Neighborhood
c -0.014  [0.003]*** 
Greek Neighborhood
c,d 
(without Italy)  -0.014 [0.003]*** 
Greek Neighborhood
c,e 
(without Sweeden)  -0.017 [0.003]*** 
Greek Neighborhood
c,f 
(without Norway)  -0.011 [0.003]*** 
Fixed Effects estimates including week dummies and excluding defaulted bonds. All regressions 
include a constant. Robust standard errors in brackets. *** = significant at 1%. Raw prices denotes 
the not corrected for coupon payments
a. Includes Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela 368 obs. (23 bonds). 
b  Includes Bulgaria, China, Denmark, Egypt, Greece, Hungary, 
Norway, Sweeden, Turkey, and Japan 592 obs. (38 bonds) 
c Includes Bulgaria, China, Egypt, 
Hungary, Italia, Norway, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweeden, and Turkey, 516 obs (37 bonds). 
d 482 
obs. (34 bonds) 
e 482 obs. (34 bonds) 
f 471 obs. (34 bonds) 
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V. Conclusion 
 
In this research, I document a type of contagion, in which the transmission 
mechanism is shared underwriter. This phenomenon is documented for two different 
episodes of financial distress at time periods of time. Both episodes share a common 
feature of desirable characteristics that allow me to identify contagion. They are isolated 
and internally-produced impeding debt restructuring event in a country with a established 
relation with a merchant bank, and there are other countries with strong ties with the same 
underwriter. This contagion is informational in essence, and arises as the flip-side of the 
relational lending coin: the very reason why relational finance (in this case, underwriting) 
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